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I. INTRODUCTION
Interstate compacts are a longstanding and increasingly important
mechanism for establishing, managing, enforcing, and coordinating
regulation. Compacts address an array of issues, including political
boundaries, common resource allocation, and environmental
regulations, reflecting the need to deal with the state and local
regulatory approach cooperatively and providing uniformity in
approaches to many regulatory problems without locking states into a
federal solution. Since Congress must approve such compacts,' states
entering into compacts typically do so against the backdrop of some
federal law. Yet federal law rarely speaks to which branch of
government within a state-the executive or legislative-has the power
to negotiate compacts on behalf of a state.
In this Essay, I address the question of which branch of state
government ought to have the authority to negotiate interstate
compacts-a question of state separation of powers. Recent case law
interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution in the context of Indian
gambling compacts provides a particularly fertile ground for exploring
this question, as it illustrates how courts are struggling to find a way to
allow state executive officials greater autonomy to negotiate interstate
compacts. Part II illustrates how traditional notions of separation of
powers under state constitutions can be understood to pose a barrier to
executive branch negotiation of interstate compacts, using a recent
Wisconsin case as a springboard for discussion. Part III illustrates how
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1. "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State ... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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Wisconsin courts have found this approach unsatisfactory and discusses
how later cases in Wisconsin and elsewhere have looked to Contract
Clause 2 principles to override traditional state separation of powers
concerns. I argue that Contract Clause principles are an unsatisfactory
way of resolving concerns with the state allocation of powers to
negotiate compacts, for both legal and policy reasons.
The Essay concludes in Part IV by arguing that, to date, Wisconsin
courts have used an isolationist interpretive method to address the
problem. As an alternative, I propose that courts interpret the
separation of powers provisions of state constitutions in the context of
the federal programs states may be furthering when they enter into
interstate compacts. Specifically, by drawing on implied preemption
principles under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,3 courts
could adequately address state separation of powers problems in this
area. Where Congress has indicated some preference for compacts and
has authorized states to enter into compacts, I propose a presumption of
state executive authority to negotiate compacts on behalf of the state.
Where a state legislature has not specifically prohibited the executive
from negotiating a compact in a regulatory area, this presumption would
authorize the executive to act on behalf of the state subject to
disapproval by the state legislature.
II. PANZER V. DOYLE: SEPARATION OF POWERS AS THE MODEL FOR
DEFINING COMPACT AUTHORITY
States extend their regulatory authority to gambling activities on
Indian reservations through the negotiation of interstate compacts with
semi-sovereign tribes. In the landmark case of California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that state
laws may be applied on tribal reservations only where Congress so
2. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; ... pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... ." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. State constitutions, such as Wisconsin's, frequently contain a similar
provision. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any
law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed .... ).
3. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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provides.4 The Court stated, "if the intent of a state law is generally to
prohibit certain conduct," the state can apply its law on reservations,
"but if the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to
regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory" and Congress "does
not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation."5  In other
words, "[t]he shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the
State's public policy."6  Following this decision, Congress passed the
Federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), allowing states to
regulate or prohibit Class III gaming activities,7 which include lotteries,
pari-mutuel on-track betting, and casino games such as blackjack,
roulette, craps, keno, and slot machines Under the federal statute,
such activities are lawful on Indian lands only to the extent they are
"located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization, or entity."9
However, the IGRA does not speak to which specific branch of
government-the legislative or executive-has the authority to
negotiate compacts with Indian tribes regarding Class III gaming. This
issue has been the topic of much litigation regarding state gambling
compacts with Indian tribes-an issue that has important issues for state
governments given the increasing size and significance of gambling
revenue in state budgets. Wisconsin's case law has oscillated on the
topic, but proves instructive for other state courts addressing the
constitutionality of gaming compacts.
In Panzer v. Doyle, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
separation of powers principles under the Wisconsin Constitution bar
the state's governor from making commitments pursuant to interstate
compacts with Indian tribes regarding gambling. ° In Wisconsin, 1987
constitutional amendments authorized pari-mutuel on-track betting and
a state-wide lottery, changing a provision of the Wisconsin Constitution
4. 480 U.S. 202,207 (1987).
5. Id. at 209.
6. Id.
7. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2000). Other activities are regulated by Indian tribes or by
tribes along with the National Indian Gaming Commission. Id. § 2710(a)(1) (Class I activities
are under the exclusive jurisdiction of Indian tribes); id. §§ 2710(a)(2), 2706(b)(1) (Class II
activities are under the jurisdiction of Indian tribes and monitored by the National Indian
Gaming Commission).
8. See id. §§ 2703(6), (7)(B), (8) (defining Class III gaming); see also WIS. STAT. §
562.057 (2005-2006) (defining Class III gambling).
9. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
10. 2004 WI 52, 64, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 64, 680 N.W.2d 666, 64, overruled in part by
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107,719 N.W.2d 408.
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that prohibited the state legislature from authorizing "any lottery.""
These provisions created confusion regarding what, exactly, would be
considered a "lottery," but a 1990 state attorney general interpretation
determined that the Wisconsin Constitution did not prohibit casino-type
games. 2 The attorney general further elaborated that "it is not my
responsibility to establish the public policy on gambling in
Wisconsin .... [The] policy as it relates to gambling is within the role,
,,13
responsibility and ability of the Legislature to address ....
This opinion was the political "hot potato" 14 that set the stage for the
dispute in Panzer v. Doyle. It purported to preclude the state from
agreeing to casino-type gambling for Indian tribes without explicit
approval by the state legislature. 5 A month after the attorney general's
opinion was issued, the legislature approved a bill that gave the
governor the authority to negotiate and enter into gaming compacts
with Indian tribes. 16  Both houses of the legislature rejected
amendments to this bill that would have required the legislature to ratify
any compacts before they became effective. 7 In Lac du Flambeau Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, a federal court read
the IGRA to incorporate Cabazon, concluding that "the state is
required to negotiate with [the] plaintiffs [Indian tribes] over the
inclusion in a tribal-state compact of any activity that includes the
elements of prize, chance and consideration and that is not prohibited
expressly by the Wisconsin Constitution or state law."'' 8 In other words,
under this case, activities that Wisconsin law does not prohibit constitute
the floor for purposes of the state's obligation to negotiate compacts
regarding these activities.
By June of 1992, Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson had
reached compact agreements with all eleven federally recognized tribes
11. As originally enacted, this section of the Wisconsin Constitution stated, "The
legislature shall never authorize any lottery, or grant any divorce." WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24
(amended 1965, 1973, 1977, 1987, 1993, 1999).
12. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 17, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 17, 680 N.W.2d 666, 17.
13. Id. J 18, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 18,680 N.W.2d 666, 18 (quoting 79 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen.
14, 31 (1990)).
14. Id. 19, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 19,680 N.W.2d 666, 19.
15. Id., 271 Wis. 2d 295, 19,680 N.W.2d 666, 19.
16. Id., 271 Wis. 2d 295, 1 19, 680 N.W.2d 666, 19. Section 14.035 of the Wisconsin
Statutes provides in full: "The governor may, on behalf of this state, enter into any compact
that has been negotiated under 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)." WIS. STAT. § 14.035 (2005-2006).
17. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, % 19, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 19, 680 N.W.2d 666, 19.
18. 770 F. Supp. 480, 488 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (citing California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)).
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in the state. 9 Some of these agreements included electronic games of
chance, blackjack, and pull-tabs or break-open tickets.20 The compacts
were generally effective for a period of seven years and would
automatically be renewed for five-year terms unless one of the parties
served written notice within 180 days prior to the end of the compact
term. 2' In 1993, however, the state again amended its constitution by
changing the prohibition on the legislature authorizing any "lottery" to
provide that "'[e]xcept as provided in this section, the legislature may
not authorize gambling in any form."'"z  The amendments contained
very detailed language, including language that prohibited games such
as blackjack.'
In 2003, Governor Jim Doyle agreed to new amendments to one of
the gaming compacts. 24 The amended compact cleared the way for a
tribe to conduct many games that had "never been legal in Wisconsin,
such as keno, roulette, craps and poker., 21 It also waived sovereign
immunity "to the extent the State... may do so pursuant to law." 26 The
amendments not only extended the scope of tribal gambling in the state
but also extended the compacts indefinitely.27 The majority leader of
the state Senate and the speaker of the General Assembly (both of
whom had supported earlier legislation giving the governor the
authority to negotiate compacts)"8 sued, alleging that the governor
lacked inherent or delegated powers under separation of powers to
negotiate the amendments to the compacts.
In Panzer v. Doyle, the Wisconsin Supreme Court embraced a strong
notion of state legislative supremacy in disputes surrounding interstate
compacts-effectively precluding state executives from making binding
compacts unless the legislature approves the compact ex post, even
where the legislature has authorized the executive to negotiate compacts
ex ante. To begin, the court reasoned that federal law would not
preempt any limits Wisconsin's constitution imposed on the governor's
19. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 1 25, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 1 25,680 N.W.2d 666, 25.
20. Id., 271 Wis. 2d 295, 1 25, 680 N.W.2d 666, T 25.
21. Id. 26, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 26,680 N.W.2d 666, 1 26.
22. Id. 29, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 29, 680 N.W.2d 666, 29 (quoting WIs. CONST. art. IV,
§ 24(1) (emphasis added)).
23. Id. T91 30-31, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 11 30-31, 680 N.W.2d 666, 1 30-31.
24. Id. 1 33, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 33, 680 N.W.2d 666, T 33.
25. Id. 91 34, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 1 34, 680 N.W.2d 666, J 34.
26. Id. 37, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 1 37,680 N.W.2d 666, 37.
27. Id. 1 35, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 91 35, 680 N.W.2d 666, 91 35.
28. Id. 91 192 n.111, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 91 192 n.111, 680 N.W.2d 666, 1 192 n.111.
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authority to adopt binding compact provisions. The IGRA states that
Class III gaming activities shall be lawfully conducted on Indian lands
only if such activities are "located in a State that permits such gaming
for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity." 29 The majority
in Panzer interpreted this statutory language to mean that the state must
expressly allow each specific type of Class III gaming prior to any tribe
conducting that particular activity. ° Under the majority's "ceiling"
interpretation of the IGRA, the state may negotiate only over gaming
that is explicitly permitted by state law.31  Although several cases
support this "ceiling" approach,32 which is based on the premise that the
IGRA supersedes the Cabazon criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory
analysis, it is inconsistent with Cabazon33 and other cases, including Lac
du Flambeau,m Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians of Wisconsin v. United States,35 and Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
v. Connecticut,36 which incorporate Cabazon into the IGRA to allow
tribal gambling if not expressly prohibited by state law.37
29. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2000).
30. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, J 88, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 88, 680 N.W.2d 666, 88 (citing Am.
Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1067-68 (D. Ariz. 2001)). The majority
in Panzer stated the "District Court [in American Greyhound] concluded that IGRA does not
permit a state to enter into compacts authorizing tribes to engage in gaming otherwise
prohibited by state law." Id., 271 Wis. 2d 295, 1 88, 680 N.W.2d 666, 88.
31. Id. 1 91,271 Wis. 2d 295, 91, 680 N.W.2d 666, 91.
32. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th
Cir. 1994); see also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 279 (8th Cir.
1993) ("The 'such gaming' language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) does not require the state to
negotiate with respect to forms of gaming it does not presently permit."); Am. Greyhound
Racing, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 (concluding that under § 2710(d)(1), "a compact cannot
make legal [C]lass III gaming not otherwise permitted by state law .... Federal courts have
adopted what the court shall call a 'ceiling' perspective, holding that [IGRA] requires
compact games to be lawful under state law.").
33. 480 U.S. 202 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
34. 770 F. Supp. 480, 488 (W.D. Wis. 1991); see supra text accompanying note 18. The
majority in Panzer took the position that the Seventh Circuit's application of the Lac du
Flambeau case was merely dicta. 2004 WI 52, 92 n.36, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 92 n.36, 680
N.W.2d 666, 92 n.36. It did not, however, address whether it was convincing dicta, and thus
failed to determine whether it is persuasive authority.
35. 367 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2004).
36. 913 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1990); see also N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 389 F.3d
1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Second Circuit has adopted the "categorical"
approach or "Wisconsin" analysis as set forth in Lac du Flambeau).
37. As one commentator has noted, "because IGRA incorporates the Cabazon test, the
proper analysis is whether the state regulates gambling or prohibits it all together; it is not
whether specific forms of gaming violate certain provisions of state law." Steven D.
Hamilton, Note, Panzer v. Doyle: The Wisconsin Supreme Court Fires a Near Fatal Shot at the
"New Buffalo," 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1341, 1374 (2006). For more discussion of the issue, see
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Based on its interpretation of the state constitution, the court
rejected arguments that the governor's power to negotiate compacts
with Indian tribes is an inherent power or a valid delegated power.38
Although two federal district court opinions had authorized state
governors to unilaterally sign a gaming compact and bind the state,39 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court did not find this approach convincing.
Instead it followed the approach of federal and state courts in Arizona,
Kansas, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island, all of which had
characterized gaming compact authority as a legislative function."0
Relying on a very formalistic notion of separation of powers under the
Wisconsin Constitution, the court stated that "committing the state to
policy choices negotiated in gaming compacts constitutes a legislative
function."41
Because the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to characterize
gaming compact authority an inherent executive power, it also had to
address whether it was a validly delegated power pursuant to past
legislative decisions. Wisconsin's nondelegation doctrine limits the
amount of legislative power the legislature can delegate to the executive
branch where the legislature fails to provide sufficient standards and
safeguards to constrain executive officials.42 By statute, Wisconsin law
clearly made the governor the state's lead negotiator on Indian gaming
compacts and also permitted the governor to bind the state once an
agreement is reached.43 However, the court reasoned that the state
legislature had not specifically delegated authority to the governor and
Steve J. Coleman, Note, Lottery Logistics: The Potential Impact of a State Lottery on Indian
Gaming in Oklahoma, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 515 (2003) (discussing the varying approaches
taken by the circuits that have addressed the issue); Amy Head, Comment, The Death of the
New Buffalo: The Fifth Circuit Slays Indian Gaming in Texas, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 377,
391-95 (2003) (arguing that "Congress [i]ntended the Cabazon [riationale to [a]pply to
IGRA").
38. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 82, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 82, 680 N.W.2d 666, 82.
39. See Langley v. Edwards, 872 F. Supp. 1531 (W.D. La. 1995); Willis v. Fordice, 850 F.
Supp. 523 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
40. See Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 62, 271 Wis. 2d 295, [ 62, 680 N.W.2d 666, 62 (citing
Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1072 (D. Ariz. 2001); State ex rel.
Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1185 (Kan. 1992); State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d
11, 23 (N.M. 1995); Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047,
1061 (N.Y. 2003); Narragansett Indian Tribe of R.I. v. State, 667 A.2d 280, 282 (R.I. 1995)).
41. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 64, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 64,680 N.W.2d 666, 64.
42. Id. 79, 271 Wis. 2d 295, T 79, 680 N.W.2d 666, 1 79.
43. Id. 19, 271 Wis. 2d 295, T 19, 680 N.W.2d 666, 19; WIS. STAT. § 14.035 (2005-
2006) ("The governor may, on behalf of this state, enter into any compact that has been
negotiated under 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)."); see supra text accompanying note 16.
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had not imposed any procedural safeguards on its exercise, so any
compact the governor negotiated would lack the legislative imprimatur
necessary for passage of a law within the state." It bears noting that
Wisconsin statutes did not prohibit the governor from negotiating
compacts with Indian tribes. The constitutional amendments regarding
gaming may have limited the ability of the state to address certain
topics, but the court agreed to hear the case as a separation of powers
challenge rather than a challenge under the 1993 amendments. 4 Given
this, the court also reasoned that the existence of a constitutionally valid
previous statute delegating expansive authority to negotiate compacts
with Indian tribes was not sufficient to render the governor's action
constitutional.46 Oddly, at the same time the court did not condemn the
1992 compacts as unconstitutional or invalidate any games authorized
by these compacts. 7
Three state justices dissented, observing that "[w]e do not
understand how the legislature can simultaneously ratify the terms of a
compact with one hand and attack it with the other."8 Further, the
dissent observed, "[i]f the governor cannot make commitments," the
Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radiation Compact and other interstate
compacts "are necessarily invalid. 4 9  As the dissent highlights, the
majority's approach in Panzer has significant implications for the
approval of interstate compacts not only in the context of Indian gaming
but also more broadly.
Panzer presents a major obstacle for Indian gambling in Wisconsin,
a source of significant revenue for the state.' More broadly, after
Panzer, binding compacts in Wisconsin seemingly require express
44. Panzer, 2004 WI 52, 82, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 82, 680 N.W.2d 666, 82. The majority
failed, however, to indicate what would constitute adequate standards or safeguards-an
ongoing problem with using the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate grants of legislative
power to the executive branch. See Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the
"New" Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (noting that courts are
unable to develop principled ways of enforcing the nondelegation doctrine).
45. For example, the court stated, "The question whether the legislature itself could
approve a gaming compact of indefinite duration is not presented in this case." Panzer, 2004
WI 52, 78 n.28, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 78 n.28, 680 N.W.2d 666, 78 n.28.
46. Id. IT 72-73, 271 Wis. 2d 295, J 72-73,680 N.W.2d 666, 72-73.
47. Id. IT 102, 112 n.46, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 102, 112 n.46, 680 N.W.2d 666, IT 102, 112
n.46.
48. Id. 186, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 186, 680 N.W.2d 666, 186 (Abrahamson, C.J., Bradley,
J., Crooks, J., dissenting).
49. Id. 187, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 187, 680 N.W.2d 666, 187 (Abrahamson, C.J., Bradley,
J., Crooks, J., dissenting).
50. An excellent discussion of its potential impact appears in Hamilton, supra note 37.
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legislative ratification ex post and the authority of state executive
branch officials to negotiate compacts is sharply limited. Also, to the
extent Panzer's approach to separation of powers is followed, state
legislatures may not be able to delegate broad compact negotiation
authority to executives ex ante. This hamstrings the state executive to
effectively act as nothing more than an agent of the state legislature in
the compact negotiation process.
III. DAIRYLAND GREYHOUND PARK, INC. V. DOYLE: LOOKING TO THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE AS A SOLUTION
While Panzer addressed gaming compacts through the lens of
separation of powers, limiting the authority of the executive branch
based on an allocation of powers argument, courts have also looked to
the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution51 (and corresponding
clauses of state constitutions) as a basis for understanding the scope of
state executive authority to negotiate compacts. 2  In other words,
although state executives might not have the authority to act as a matter
of state law, under separation of powers principles, once they do act in
ways that create legally enforceable obligations, federal and
constitutional guarantees trump any state constitutional separation of
powers concern.
For example, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that Michigan's
governor has broader authority to negotiate gambling compacts with
Indian tribes than the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized in Panzer.
In 1997, Michigan's Governor Engler negotiated compacts regarding
Indian gambling, providing that these would take effect after
"[e]ndorsement by the Governor of the State and concurrence in that
endorsement by resolution of the Michigan Legislature. 5 3 Following
the Governor's endorsement, the Michigan legislature endorsed the
compacts by joint resolution.' A separation of powers challenge to the
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
52. The U.S. Supreme Court first suggested that interstate compacts are contracts in
1823, in Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). As the Court stated there, "[i]f we
attend to the definition of a contract, which is the agreement of two or more parties, to do, or
not to do, certain acts, it must be obvious, that the propositions offered, and agreed to by
Virginia, being accepted and ratified by Kentucky, is a contract. In fact, the terms compact
and contract are synonymous.... " Id. at 92.
53. See Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. State, 685 N.W.2d 221, 225 (Mich. 2004)
(quoting the compacts at issue).
54. Id.
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compacts claimed they were not valid because they had failed to go
through Michigan's constitutional lawmaking process.
However, the Supreme Court of Michigan reasoned that legislative
involvement in compact approval is best characterized as "contract[],
not legislation."55 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act does not give
states any authority to regulate Indian gaming, but only authorizes
states to negotiate with tribes through the compacting process.16 The
court observed that Michigan's constitution gives the legislature the
power to contract by expressing "assent," as occurred with passage of a
joint resolution. 7 The court rejected the analogy to Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Chadha's requirement that exercises of
legislative power meet constitutional lawmaking requirements, such as
bicameralism and presentment prior to veto. 8 On this view, so long as
the legislature has delegated the authority to negotiate contracts to the
executive branch, once the executive negotiates a compact there is no
requirement for the legislature to sign off on the compact ex post.
While this approach-understanding gaming compacts through the lens
of the federal statute as contracts rather than legislation-avoids the
separation of powers problem by authorizing state executives to
negotiate compacts, it can also have important implications for a state's
ability to modify compacts.
Wisconsin's Supreme Court relied on the understanding of gaming
compacts as contracts in Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, a
case that overrules portions of Panzer.5 9 After Panzer, all forms of
gambling not expressly permitted by Wisconsin law are presumably
illegal, but Panzer expressly failed to address the amended compacts.
6 °
55. Id. at 226.
56. Id. at 227.
57. Id. at 232.
58. Id. at 232-34 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983)).
59. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 1 2, 719 N.W.2d 408, 1 2.
60. Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 1102, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 102, 680 N.W.2d 666, 102,
overruled in part by Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, 719 N.W.2d 408. The
majority stated:
[W]e do not believe the 1992 compact suffered from any infirmity under
state law when it was entered into. Whether the 1992 compact is durable
enough to withstand a change in state law that alters our understanding of
what is 'permitted' in Wisconsin is a separate question. The resolution of
this question is likely to turn, at least in part, on the application of the
impairment of contracts clauses in the United States and Wisconsin
Constitutions as well as IGRA.
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Dairyland Greyhound relied on Panzer to argue that the 1993
constitutional amendment does not violate the impairment of contracts
clauses in the federal and state constitutions. In its Dairyland opinion,
the court held that that Wisconsin's 1993 constitutional amendment did
not invalidate the original gaming compacts that had been negotiated by
Governor Thompson. The court reasoned that the right to renewal in
the original compacts is constitutionally protected by the Contract
Clauses of the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions.61 The court also
stated, "We withdraw any language to the contrary in Panzer ... that
would limit the State's ability to negotiate for Class III games under the
[o]riginal [c]ompacts."'62
The Contract Clause argument for validating compacts negotiated
by a state executive has an attraction in that it may give greater
flexibility to state courts addressing the constitutionality of executive
negotiated interstate compacts, but the argument is based on a
misreading of Contract Clause cases and also has adverse policy
consequences in the compact process. While bilateral compacts may not
present difficulties regarding modification, as two parties will typically
agree to any changes in a compact's terms, multilateral compacts are
more likely to undergo revisions without approval of every compact
party. If courts read the Contract Clause to preclude modifications to
compacts, what is gained in judicial flexibility in upholding compacts
comes at the cost of flexibility in the compact process and may
undermine the power of an individual state to impose conditions on a
compact during the bargaining process.
In holding that the compacts produced binding commitments,
despite the failure of the compacts to expressly address the scope of the
commitments, Dairyland's majority seems to overextend the legal
protections the U.S. Supreme Court has afforded in its Contract Clause
cases. To begin, in order to assert a valid Contract Clause claim, a state
must have acted in its sovereign capacity. This begs the separation of
powers question of which institution-the legislature or the governor-
has the authority to act as the sovereign on behalf of the state. The
separation of powers problem, in other words, remains, and only if we
rely on a meaninglessly capacious notion of state sovereignty-
Id., 271 Wis. 2d 295, T 102, 680 N.W.2d 666, 102. The court further noted that the plaintiffs
in Panzer conceded the validity of the 1992 original compacts and the 1998 amendments
thereto, and the majority has "not as yet been presented with a persuasive case to conclude
otherwise." Id. 98 n.38,271 Wis. 2d 295, 98 n.38, 680 N.W.2d 666, T 98 n.38.
61. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, 1 2, 719 N.W.2d 408, $ 2.
62. Id., 719 N.W.2d 408, 1 2.
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effectively making every commitment by every state actor irrevocable-
can the Contract Clause provide a legal answer to the question
presented. In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
police power of states-the protection of public health and morals-is
not generally something a state can bargain away.63 The Court has
consistently recognized that gambling and lotteries fall within this class
of activities, casting doubt on the general claim that compacts regarding
these activities are per se contract rather than legislation. 6 Recent case
law affirms the principle that binding commitments can only be made by
clear and unmistakable commitments by the relevant state sovereign.
Under the unmistakability doctrine clarified in United States v. Winstar
Corp., the Court recognized that only clear and unambiguous
contractual commitments can be enforced. 6 There the Court concluded
that, absent an unmistakable provision by the sovereign to the contrary,
"'[c]ontractual arrangements, including those to which a sovereign itself
is a party, 'remain subject to subsequent legislation' by the sovereign." ' 66
Moreover, over reliance on the Contract Clause as a mechanism for
validating interstate compacts negotiated by state executive actors may
have negative policy implications for interstate compacts. To the extent
the Contract Clause restricts a state's ability to modify or renegotiate
the terms of interstate compacts, it risks making all compacts binding
commitments that can only be modified by consent of every party and
thus undermines flexibility on compact terms. As a result, interstate
compacts will be less likely to include enforceable legal obligations, and,
when they do, these obligations will lack regulatory flexibility. In
bilateral compacts, the adverse policy impacts may be minimal, but
where compacts are more complex, involving multiple sovereigns, the
Contract Clause argument may make compacts so rigid that the only
way they can be renegotiated is with unanimity. It may also undermine
63. See Atd. Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914) (noting that
the Contract Clause does not have "the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish
all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort,
or general welfare of the community"); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 502-03 (1897)
(noting that a lottery grant is not a contract "but is simply a gratuity and license"); Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818-19 (1879) ("No legislature can bargain away the public health
or the public morals.").
64. For example, Stone held that the State of Mississippi could not bargain away its
power to prohibit lotteries in the future, 101 U.S. at 818-19; Douglas allowed the
Commonwealth of Kentucky to prohibit lotteries, 168 U.S. at 502-03.
65. 518 U.S. 839, 880 (1996).
66. Id. at 877 (quoting Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477
U.S. 41, 52 (1986)).
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procedures that many interstate compacts set up that are designed to
provide for renegotiation of compact terms in the future.
IV. TOWARDS A NONISOLATIONIST ALTERNATIVE: IMPLIED
PREEMPTION AND A PRESUMPTION OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO
NEGOTIATE COMPACTS WHERE CONGRESS HAS SPOKEN Ex ANTE
While the two cases rely on different constitutional provisions and
reach differing conclusions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's approaches
to gaming compacts in Panzer and Dairyland use similar methods in
interpreting state constitutions. Panzer looks to state separation of
powers provisions, relying on Wisconsin's constitution independent of
federal goals and programs. 67 Dairyland looks to the Contract Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, along with similar Wisconsin provisions, drawing
on a constitutional protection to trump separation of powers
provisions.68 In this sense, both cases take an isolationist approach,
relying on the positive textual protections provided by a single
constitution to solve the problem of state executive authority to
negotiate compacts. What both approaches ignore, however, is that this
problem arises due to overlapping jurisdictions-between state
constitutions, on the one hand, and interstate coordination, consistent
with federally-articulated goals, on the other. By contrast, interpreting a
state constitution's separation of powers issues in the context of the
broader federal goals positioned in a national constitution would allow
state courts to respect separation of powers without disabling states
from participating in interstate solutions to problems, such as compacts.
Such an approach would recognize that the federal role in approving
interstate compacts has changed substantially over the past one hundred
years. Beginning in the 1930s, Congress modified its approach to
approving interstate compacts-increasingly authorizing interstate
compacts ex ante rather than merely approving them ex post.69 The
Crime Control Act of 1934--developed not by a group of appointed
state representatives but by an ad hoc gathering of state officials, none
of whom had been delegated the authority to enter into a compact on
behalf of their states-contained Congress's consent for an interstate
compact governing the supervision of parolees who move legally
67. See supra Part II.
68. See supra Part III.
69. CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF
INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 76-77 (2006).
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between states and invited states to participate in the compact.70 By
1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and
Probationers was born; the compact was ultimately given legislative
approval by all fifty states.7" Thereafter, numerous other interstate
compacts originated out of similar congressional authorization ex ante,
followed by informal efforts by state officials to negotiate compact
terms. For example, in the Clean Air Act, Congress gave its ex ante
consent to agreements for the "prevention and control of air pollution
and the enforcement of their respective laws" between two or more
states. The Clean Water Act contains similar language,73 as does the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act.74
One leading account of state constitutions, advanced by James
Gardner, envisions courts as presumptively exercising the authority to
interpret state constitutions where there are potential conflicts between
state and national power. 75  Gardner's account of state constitutional
interpretation recognizes that state courts do not interpret their
constitutions in isolation when dealing with issues of state/federal
coordination.6 Gardner argues that state courts serve an important
function in interpreting state constitutions to the extent that they
provide a resistance against the exercise of federal power, particularly in
ways that reduce liberty.' As I have argued elsewhere, state courts also
may play an important role in coordinating national goals.78 For this to
occur, state courts must avoid an isolationist approach to addressing
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 42 U.S.C. §7402(c) (2000). This is an ex ante authorization only. As the Clean Air
Act states, "No such agreement or compact shall be binding or obligatory upon any State a
party thereto unless and until it has been approved by Congress" ex post. Id.
73. 33 U.S.C. §1253(b) (2000).
74. 42 U.S.C. §2021d(a)(2) (2000).
75. JAMES GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005).
76. Id. at 87-94; see, e.g., Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976);
McFaddin v. Jackson, 738 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn. 1987); Ex parte Elliott, 973 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.
App. 1998). Elsewhere, I argue that implicit authorization for state executive and local
agencies to act on behalf of federal goals is the best interpretation of state separation of
powers-a matter of state constitutional law that state and federal courts should
acknowledge. See Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of
Powers and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343 (2005).
77. GARDNER, supra note 75, at 91.
78. Jim Rossi, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 211 (2006) (reviewing
GARDNER, supra note 75).
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separation of powers issues where federal programs or interstate goals
are at issue.
A non-isolationist approach to separation of powers would lead the
Wisconsin Supreme Court down a very different path from Panzer or
Dairyland. As the Supreme Court recognized in Cabazon, once a state
allows some forms of gambling, the IGRA preempts the ability of the
state to regulate Indian gaming.79 Relying on this case, a federal judge
in Wisconsin concluded that the "state is required to negotiate with
plaintiffs over the inclusion in a tribal-state compact of any activity that
includes the elements of prize, chance and consideration and that is not
prohibited expressly by the Wisconsin Constitution or state law."
8
Indeed, one analysis of Panzer observes that "the majority
misinterpreted the statutory text of IGRA by reading the Cabazon
analysis out of the statute.",
81
It is important to distinguish between state legislative action that
expressly prohibits the executive from negotiating compacts, on the one
hand, and state legislation that is ambiguous or silent regarding the
executive's authority to negotiate compacts, on the other. Prohibiting
an executive from acting is one thing, but failing to authorize it is
another altogether. Where Congress has expressed a preference for
interstate compacts and has authorized states to enter into compacts,
courts could draw on the Supremacy Clause to preempt state separation
of powers principles; in other words, Congress' authorization of
interstate compacts could be used to impliedly preempt any state
constitutional requirement that a legislature specifically authorize the
executive to negotiate compacts. Such a presumption would not reduce
the power of state legislatures but would clarify that legislative power to
limit the authority of the executive in the context of federally authorized
interstate compacts only has legal effect where it is expressly invoked.8
Indeed, such an approach could be agenda-forcing in the arena of
state politics. Where a state legislature has not explicitly prohibited an
executive from negotiating compacts, this approach would encourage
79. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1987).
80. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F.
Supp. 480,488 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
81. Hamilton, supra note 37, at 1382.
82. Elsewhere, I argue for a presumption in the context of interstate crisis to deal with
the alleged separation of powers limits on state executive emergency management. See Jim
Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237 (2006). A presumption of state
executive authority to negotiate interstate compacts where Congress has signaled its
preference for cooperation between sovereigns can be justified along similar lines.
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the executive branch to negotiate compacts. The state legislature may
reject the terms of those compacts after the fact, if it so wishes. In
contrast, to preclude an executive from negotiating compacts unless a
legislature first explicitly authorizes the executive to negotiate
compacts-as in Panzer-would likely serve to keep states from
participating in the compact process in the first place. This could
undermine federal goals while also keeping state legislatures from
addressing the real issues presented in a compact.
Moving beyond state constitutional interpretation, which depends
primarily on the approach of state courts, one solution to such future
disputes would be for Congress to expressly preempt state separation of
powers in statutes addressing interstate compacts. Congress has
certainly spoken to the issue of state officials before. In the context of
presidential election disputes, the Constitution specifically assigns a role
to state legislatures in selecting representatives to the national electoral
college. 3 Congress itself has elaborated on the approach by which state
legislatures should play this role.' As long as it is operating within its
83. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 states the following:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but
no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
84. As Congress has stated:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for
the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any
controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the
electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures, and
such determination shall have been made at least six days before the time
fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made pursuant to
such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior to said
time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the
counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as
hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors
appointed by such State is concerned.
3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). This statutory language, of course, was central to the dispute decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Interestingly, in the majority
opinion in that case, state separation of powers played absolutely no role in resolving the
issues presented. While that was an issue that inspired great criticism of the Court's
approach, there is no doubt how the majority decided to approach the issue. For examples of
criticism, see Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore?, 34 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 20 (2002) (criticizing the majority "for impermissibly usurp[ing] the Florida
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constitutional powers, Congress could name the relevant state officials
for purposes of negotiating and adopting interstate compacts, in effect
expressly preempting any expected state separation of powers conflict.
For example, in enacting legislation that favors interstate compacts,
Congress might specifically provide that state executives have the
authority to enter into compacts-even where a legislature has failed to
delegate authority under a state constitution. It would be more
controversial for Congress to preempt states by adopting ex post an
interstate compact which was negotiated under questionable authority,
but even this probably does not extend beyond Congress' power to
preempt state separation of powers. As long as Congress does not
require the state to enter into compacts, and elected state officials retain
discretion, there is no Tenth Amendment problem presented with
Congress naming state executives in legislation in order to encourage
them to negotiate compacts independent of state legislatures.
While state courts could fashion a presumption of state executive
power to negotiate compacts primarily from state constitutional law
principles, a presumption of state executive power to negotiate
compacts that draws on federal preemption principles could have
important implications for litigation regarding interstate compacts. To
the extent such a presumption draws on preemption principles under the
Supremacy Clause, it is primarily a principle of federal-not state-law.
State courts may have ways of resolving such issues on their own
constitutional terms. However, should they fail to do so, the approach
of this Essay suggests that many interstate compact issues, including the
disputes raised in cases such as Panzer and Dairyland, are issues best
decided by federal, not state, courts.
V. CONCLUSION
State constitutional isolationism has provided an unsatisfactory
approach to resolving the separation of powers problems presented with
executive negotiation of interstate compacts, such as the gambling
Supreme Court's authority to decide Florida law in this extraordinary case"); Louise
Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 609, 654 (2002) (making the broad claim that "[t]here is inevitable offense to principles
of federalism when the Supreme Court or other federal court takes a contested election from
the processes, however clumsy, that a state legislature has prescribed to deal with it"). If
Bush v. Gore is understood as relying on the U.S. Constitution and a federal statute to
preempt state election laws, and to specifically assign powers to state legislatures, it is unclear
how it would offend notions of federalism.
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compacts that recently have been in dispute in Wisconsin. A
nonisolationist approach would recognize the value of interstate
cooperation through compacts. Such a recognition will not tolerate an
isolationist separation of powers analysis, but instead interpret
separation of powers in the context of federal preemption concerns.
Where Congress has spoken clearly about the need for interstate
cooperation, federal law will override state separation of powers
concerns, allowing a state executive to take the lead in negotiating a
compact. Separation of powers doctrine still may impose a barrier to
compacts where there is no clear federal directive. In addition, a state
legislature may pass a law rejecting the terms of a compact. However,
where Congress has spoken ex ante regarding the desirability of
interstate compacts, there is no reason for state separation of powers to
stand in the way to the establishment of such compacts, especially where
a state legislature has given the state executive ex ante authority to
negotiate compacts.
